Comparing the incommensurable: where science and politics collide.
Arguments about the possibility that cognitive variables may play a causal role in human behavior are unlikely to be resolved in favor of one side or the other, because they set against each other two incommensurable views of human agency. Contemporary cognitive models of psychology are based on an implicitly dualist view of human behavior, assuming the existence of a nonmaterial mental realm which has the capacity to act on the material world. Critics, by comparison, frequently argue from an epiphenomenalist position. While there may be sound scientific reasons for rejecting self-efficacy theory, and particularly for rejecting the utility of the concept that behavior is caused by efficacy expectations, this paper argues that epistemic criteria are frequently less important than a sense that a theory is compatible with a particular world view. I argue that cognitive theories are accepted by the psychological mainstream because their dualist basis accords with deeply held cultureal beliefs about the relationship between the person and the world. However, the social and political consequences of such models are rarely articulated, and there is a need for psychologists to develop a more explicit understanding of the relationship between psychological theories and their broader implications.